China’s Big Mac Attack

James L. Watson

RONALD McDoNALD GOES TO CHINA

Looming over Beijing’s choking, bumper-to-bumper traffic, every tenth building seems to sport a giant neon sign advertising American wares: Xerox, Mobil, Kinko’s, Northwest Airlines, IBM, Jeep, Gerber, even the Jolly Green Giant. American food chains and beverages are everywhere in central Beijing: Coca-Cola, Starbucks, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Häagen-Dazs, Dunkin’ Donuts, Baskin-Robbins, Pepsi, TCBY, Pizza Hut, and of course McDonald’s. As of June 1999, McDonald’s had opened 235 restaurants in China. Hong Kong alone now boasts 158 McDonald’s franchises, one for every 42,000 residents (compared to one for every 30,000 Americans).

Fast food can even trump hard politics. After NATO accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the war in Kosovo, Beijing students tried to organize a boycott of American companies in protest. Coca-Cola and McDonald’s were at the top of their hit list, but the message seemed not to have reached Beijing’s busy consumers: the three McDonald’s I visited last July were packed with Chinese tourists, local yuppies, and grandparents treating their “little emperors and empresses” to Happy Meals. The only departure from the familiar American setting was the menu board (which was in Chinese, with English in smaller print) and the jarring sound of Mandarin shouted over cellular phones. People were downing burgers, fries, and Cokes. It was, as Yogi Berra said, déjà vu all over again; I had seen this scene a hundred times

James L. Watson is Fairbank Professor of Chinese Society and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard University. He is the editor of Golden Arches East: McDonald’s in East Asia.

[120]
China's Big Mac Attack

before in a dozen countries. Is globalism—and its cultural variant, McDonaldization—the face of the future?

IMPERIALISM AND A SIDE OF FRIES

American acade me is teeming with theorists who argue that transnational corporations like McDonald's provide the shock troops for a new form of imperialism that is far more successful, and therefore more insidious, than its militarist antecedents. Young people everywhere, the argument goes, are avid consumers of soap operas, music videos, cartoons, electronic games, martial-arts books, celebrity posters, trendy clothing, and faddish hairstyles. To cater to them, shopping malls, supermarkets, amusement parks, and fast-food restaurants are popping up everywhere. Younger consumers are forging transnational bonds of empathy and shared interests that will, it is claimed, transform political alignments in ways that most world leaders—old men who do not read Wired—cannot begin to comprehend, let alone control. Government efforts to stop the march of American (and Japanese) pop culture are futile; censorship and trade barriers succeed only in making forbidden films, music, and Web sites irresistible to local youth.

One of the clearest expressions of the “cultural imperialism” hypothesis appeared in a 1996 New York Times op-ed by Ronald Steel: “It was never the Soviet Union, but the United States itself that is the true revolutionary power. ... We purvey a culture based on mass entertainment and mass gratification. ... The cultural message we transmit through Hollywood and McDonald’s goes out across the world to capture, and also to undermine, other societies. ... Unlike traditional conquerors, we are not content merely to subdue others: We insist that they be like us.” In his recent book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman presents a more benign view of the global influence of McDonald’s. Friedman has long argued in his New York Times column that McDonald’s and other manifestations of global culture serve the interests of middle classes that are emerging in autocratic, undemocratic societies. Furthermore, he notes, countries that have a McDonald’s within their borders have never gone to war against each other. (The NATO war against Serbia would seem to
shatter Friedman’s Big Mac Law, but he does not give up easily. In his July 2, 1999, column, he argued that the shutdown and rapid reopening of Belgrade’s six McDonald’s actually prove his point."

If Steel and his ideological allies are correct, McDonald’s should be the poster child of cultural imperialism. McDonald’s today has more than 25,000 outlets in 119 countries. Most of the corporation’s revenues now come from operations outside the United States, and a new restaurant opens somewhere in the world every 17 hours.

McDonald’s makes heroic efforts to ensure that its food looks, feels, and tastes the same everywhere. A Big Mac in Beijing tastes virtually identical to a Big Mac in Boston. Menus vary only when the local market is deemed mature enough to expand beyond burgers and fries. Consumers can enjoy Spicy Wings (red-pepper-laced chicken) in Beijing, kosher Big Macs (minus the cheese) in Jerusalem, vegetable McNuggets in New Delhi, or a McHuevo (a burger with fried egg) in Montevideo. Nonetheless, wherever McDonald’s takes root, the core product—at least during the initial phase of operation—is not really the food but the experience of eating in a cheerful, air-conditioned, child-friendly restaurant that offers the revolutionary innovation of clean toilets.

Critics claim that the rapid spread of McDonald’s and its fast-food rivals undermines indigenous cuisines and helps create a homogeneous, global culture. Beijing and Hong Kong thus make excellent test cases since they are the dual epicenters of China’s haute cuisine (with apologies to Hunan, Sichuan, and Shanghai loyalists). If McDonald’s can make inroads in these two markets, it must surely be an unstoppable force that levels cultures. But the truth of this parable of globalization is subtler than that.

THE SECRET OF MY SUCCESS

How did McDonald’s do it? How did a hamburger chain become so prominent in a cultural zone dominated by rice, noodles, fish, and pork? In China, adult consumers often report that they find the taste of fried beef patties strange and unappealing. Why, then, do they come back to McDonald’s? And more to the point, why do they encourage their children to eat there?
The history of McDonald's in Hong Kong offers good clues about the mystery of the company's worldwide appeal. When Daniel Ng, an American-trained engineer, opened Hong Kong's first McDonald's in 1975, his local food-industry competitors dismissed the venture as a nonstarter: "Selling hamburgers to Cantonese? You must be joking!" Ng credits his boldness to the fact that he did not have an M.B.A. and had never taken a course in business theory.

During the early years of his franchise, Ng promoted McDonald's as an outpost of American culture, offering authentic hamburgers to "with-it" young people eager to forget that they lived in a tiny colony on the rim of Maoist China. Those who experienced what passed for hamburgers in British Hong Kong during the 1960s and 1970s will appreciate the innovation. Ng made the fateful decision not to compete with Chinese-style fast-food chains that had started a few years earlier (the largest of which, Café de Coral, was established in 1969). The signs outside his first restaurants were in English; the Chinese characters for McDonald's (Cantonese Mak-dong-lou, Mandarin Mai-dang-lao) did not appear until the business was safely established. Over a period of 20 years, McDonald's gradually became a mainstay of Hong Kong's middle-class culture. Today the restaurants are packed wall-to-wall with busy commuters, students, and retirees who treat them as homes away from home. A

FOREIGN AFFAIRS • May/June 2000 [123]
1997 survey I conducted among Hong Kong university students revealed that few were even aware of the company’s American origins. For Hong Kong youth, McDonald’s is a familiar institution that offers comfort foods that they have eaten since early childhood.

Yunxiang Yan, a UCLA anthropologist, hints that a similar localization process may be underway in Beijing. McDonald’s there is still a pricey venue that most Chinese treat as a tourist stop: you haven’t really “done” Beijing unless you have visited the Forbidden City, walked around Tiananmen Square, and eaten at the “Golden Arches.” Many visitors from the countryside take Big Mac boxes, Coke cups, and napkins home with them as proof that they did it right. Yan also discovered that working-class Beijing residents save up to take their kids to McDonald’s and hover over them as they munch. (Later the adults eat in a cheaper, Chinese-style restaurant.) Parents told Yan that they wanted their children to “connect” with the world outside China. To them, McDonald’s was an important stop on the way to Harvard Business School or the MIT labs. Yan has since discovered that local yuppies are beginning to eat Big Macs regularly. In 20 years, he predicts, young people in Beijing (like their counterparts in Hong Kong today) will not even care about the foreign origin of McDonald’s, which will be serving ordinary food to people more interested in getting a quick meal than in having a cultural experience. The key to this process of localization is China’s changing family system and the emergence of a “singleton” (only-child) subculture.

THE LITTLE EMPERORS

In China, as in other parts of East Asia, the startup date for McDonald’s corresponds to the emergence of a new class of consumers with money to spend on family entertainment. Rising incomes are dramatically changing lifestyles, especially among younger couples in China’s major cities. Decisions about jobs and purchases no longer require consultations with an extended network of parents, grandparents, adult siblings, and other kin. More married women in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shanghai work outside the home, which in turn affects child-rearing practices, residence patterns, and gender relations. At least in the larger cities, men no longer rule the roost. One of
China’s most popular television shows features a search for the “ideal husband,” a man who does the shopping, washes the dishes, and changes the baby’s diapers—behavior inconceivable in Mao’s heyday.

Most Chinese newlyweds are choosing to create their own homes, thereby separating themselves from parents and in-laws. The traditional system of living with the groom’s parents is dying out fast, even in the Chinese countryside. Recent research in Shanghai and Dalian (and Taipei) shows that professional couples prefer to live near the wife’s mother, often in the same apartment complex. The crucial consideration is household labor—child care, cooking, shopping, washing, and cleaning. With both husband and wife working full time, someone has to do it, and the wife’s mother is considered more reliable (and less trouble) than the husband’s mother, who would expect her daughter-in-law to be subservient.

In response to these social and economic changes, a new Chinese family system is emerging that focuses on the needs and aspirations of the married couple—the conjugal unit. Conjugality brings with it a package of attitudes and practices that undermine traditional Chinese views regarding filial piety and Confucianism. Should younger couples strive, irrespective of personal cost, to promote the welfare of the larger kin group and support their aging parents? Or should they concentrate on building a comfortable life for themselves and their offspring? Increasingly, the balance is shifting toward conjugality and away from the Confucian norms that guided earlier generations.

The shift also coincides with a dramatic decline in China’s birth rate and a rise in the amount of money and attention lavished on children. The Communist Party’s single-child family policy has helped produce a generation of “little emperors and empresses,” each commanding the undivided affection and economic support of two parents and (if lucky) four grandparents. The Chinese press is awash with articles bemoaning the rise of singletons who are selfish, maladjusted, and spoiled beyond repair—although psychologists working on China’s singletons find them little different from their American or European counterparts.
McDonald’s opened in Beijing in 1992, a time when changes in family values were matched by a sustained economic boom. The startup date also coincided with a public “fever” for all things American—sports, clothing, films, food, and so on. American-style birthday parties became key to the company’s expansion strategy. Prior to the arrival of McDonald’s, festivities marking youngsters’ specific birth dates were unknown in most of East Asia. In Hong Kong, for instance, lunar-calendar dates of birth were recorded for use in later life—to help match prospective marriage partners’ horoscopes or choose an auspicious burial date. Until the late 1970s and early 1980s, most people paid little attention to their calendar birth date if they remembered it at all. McDonald’s and its rivals now promote the birthday party—complete with cake, candles, and silly hats—in television advertising aimed directly at kids.

McDonald’s also introduced other localized innovations that appeal to younger customers. In Beijing, Ronald McDonald (a.k.a. Uncle McDonald) is paired with an Aunt McDonald whose job is to entertain children and help flustered parents. All over East Asia, McDonald’s offers a party package that includes food, cake, gifts, toys, and the exclusive use of a children’s enclosure sometimes known as the Ronald Room. Birthday parties are all the rage for upwardly mobile youngsters in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shanghai. Given that most people in these cities live in tiny, overcrowded flats, the local Kentucky Fried Chicken or McDonald’s is a convenient and welcoming place for family celebrations.

For the first time in Chinese history, children matter not simply as future providers but as full-scale consumers who command respect in today’s economy. Until the 1980s, kids rarely ate outside the home. When they did, they were expected to eat what was put in front of them. The idea that children might actually order their own food would have shocked most adults; only foreign youngsters were permitted to make their opinions known in public, which scandalized everyone within earshot. Today children have money in their pockets, most of which they spend on snacks. New industries and a specialized service sector have emerged to feed this category of consumers, as the anthropologist Jun Jing has noted in his new book, *Feeding China’s Little Emperors*. In effect, the fast-food industry helped start a consumer
revolution by encouraging children as young as three or four to march up to the counter, slap down their money, and choose their own food.

In Hong Kong, McDonald’s has become so popular that parents use visits to their neighborhood outlet as a reward for good behavior or academic achievement. An old friend told me that withholding McDonald’s visits was the only threat that registered with his wayward son. “It is my nuclear deterrent,” he said.

McDonald’s could not have succeeded in East Asia without appealing to new generations of consumers—children from 3 to 13 and their harried, stressed-out parents. No amount of stealth advertising or brilliant promotions could have done the trick alone. The fast-food industry did not create a market where none existed; it responded to an opportunity presented by the collapse of an outdated Confucian family system. In effect, McDonald’s tailgated the family revolution as it swept through East Asia, first in Japan and Hong Kong (1970s), then in Taiwan and South Korea (1980s), and finally in China (1990s). There is no great mystery here, unless one is predisposed to seeing imperialist plots behind every successful business.

GRIMACE

In 1994, students protesting against California’s Proposition 187, which restricted state services to immigrants, ransacked a McDonald’s in Mexico City, scrawling “Yankee go home” on the windows. In August 1999 French farmers dumped tons of manure and rotting apricots in front of their local McDonald’s to protest U.S. sanctions on European food imports. During the past five years, McDonald’s restaurants have been the targets of violent protests—including bombings—in over 50 countries, in cities including Rome, Macao, Rio de Janeiro, Prague, London, and Jakarta.

Why McDonald’s? Other transnationals—notably Coca-Cola, Disney, and Pepsi—also draw the ire of anti-American demonstrators, but no other company can compete with the “Golden Arches.” McDonald’s is often the preferred site for anti-American demonstrations even in places where the local embassies are easy to get at. McDonald’s is more than a purveyor of food; it is a saturated symbol for everything that environmentalists, protectionists, and anticapitalist
James L. Watson

activists find objectionable about American culture. McDonald’s even stands out in the physical landscape, marked by its distinctive double-arched logo and characteristic design. Like the Stars and Stripes, the Big Mac stands for America.

Despite the symbolic load it carries, McDonald’s can hardly be held responsible for the wholesale subversion of local cuisines, as its many critics claim. In China’s larger cities, traditional specialties are supported by middle-class connoisseurs who treat eating out as a hobby and a diversion. Beijing’s food scene today is a gourmet’s paradise compared to the grim days of Maoist egalitarianism, when China’s public canteens gave real meaning to the term “industrialized food.” Party leaders may have enjoyed haute cuisine on the sly, but for most people, eating extravagantly was a counterrevolutionary crime. During the 1960s, refugee chefs kept microregional specialties alive in the back streets of Hong Kong and Taipei, where Panyu-style seafood, Shandong noodles, and Shunde vegetarian delights could be had at less than a dollar a head. Today, many Cantonese and Taiwanese lament the old refugees’ retirement and complain that no one has carried on their culinary traditions; the chefs’ own children, of course, have become brokers, lawyers, and professors.

Meanwhile, there has been an explosion of exotic new cuisines in China’s cities: Thai, Malaysian, Indonesian, French, Spanish, Nepali, Mexican, and Hong Kong’s latest hit, Louisiana creole. Chinese-style restaurants must now compete with these “ethnic” newcomers in a vast smorgasbord. The arrival of fast food is only one dimension of a much larger Chinese trend toward the culinary adventurism associated with rising affluence.

McDonald’s has not been entirely passive, as demonstrated by its successful promotion of American-style birthday parties. Some try to tag McDonald’s as a polluter and exploiter, but most Chinese consumers see the company as a force for the improvement of urban life. Clean toilets were a welcome development in cities where, until recently, a visit to a public restroom could be harrowing. The chain’s preoccupation with cleanliness has raised consumer expectations and forced competitors to provide equally clean facilities. Ray Kroc, the legendary founder of McDonald’s, was once asked if he had actually scrubbed out toilets during the early years of his franchise: “You're damn right
I did,” he shot back, “and I’d clean one today if it needed it.” In a 1993 interview, Daniel Ng described his early efforts to import the Kroc ethos to his Hong Kong franchise. After an ineffectual first try, one new employee was ordered to clean the restrooms again. The startled worker replied that the toilets were already cleaner than the collective facilities he used at home. Ng told him that standards at McDonald’s were higher and ordered him to do it again.

Another innovation is the line, a social institution that is seldom appreciated until it collapses. When McDonald’s opened in Hong Kong, customers clumped around the cash registers, pushing their money over the heads of the people ahead of them—standard procedure in local train stations, banks, and cinemas. McDonald’s management appointed an employee (usually a young woman) to act as queue monitor, and within a few months, regular consumers began to enforce the system themselves by glaring at newcomers who had the effrontery to jump ahead. Today the line is an accepted feature of Hong Kong’s middle-class culture, and it is making headway in Beijing and Shanghai. Whether or not McDonald’s deserves the credit for this particular innovation, many East Asian consumers associate the “Golden Arches” with public civility.

HAVE IT YOUR WAY

At first glance, McDonald’s appears to be the quintessential transnational, with its own corporate culture nurtured at Hamburger University in Oak Brook, Illinois. But James Cantalupo, the president of McDonald’s Corporation, maintains that his strategy is to become as much a part of local culture as possible and protests when people call McDonald’s a multinational or a transnational. “I like to call us multilocal,” he told The Christian Science Monitor in 1991. McDonald’s goes out of its way to find local suppliers whenever it enters a new market. In China, for instance, the company nurtures its own network of russet-potato growers to provide french fries of the requisite length. McDonald’s has also learned to rely on self-starters like Daniel Ng to run its foreign franchises—with minimal interference from Oak Brook. Another winning strategy, evident everywhere in East Asia, is promoting promising young “crew” (behind-the-counter)
workers into management’s ranks. Surprisingly few managers are dispatched from the Illinois headquarters. Yan found only one American, a Chinese-speaker, on McDonald’s Beijing management team.

Critics of the fast-food industry assume that corporations always call the shots and that consumers have little choice but to accept what is presented to them. In fact, the process of localization is a two-way street, involving changes in the local culture as well as modifications of the company’s standard mode of operation.

The hallmark of the American fast-food business is the displacement of labor costs from the corporation to consumers. For the system to work, consumers must be educated—or “disciplined”—so that they voluntarily fulfill their side of an implicit bargain: we (the corporation) will provide cheap, fast service if you (the customer) carry your own tray, seat yourself, eat quickly, help clean up afterward, and depart promptly to make room for others. Try breaking this contract in Boston or Pittsburgh by spreading out your newspaper and starting to work on a crossword puzzle in McDonald’s. You will soon be ousted—politely in Pittsburgh, less so in Boston.

Key elements of McDonald’s pan-national system—notably lining up and self-seating—have been readily accepted by consumers throughout East Asia. Other aspects of the Oak Brook model have been rejected, especially those relating to time and space. In Hong Kong, Taipei, and Beijing, consumers have turned their neighborhood restaurants into leisure centers for seniors and after-school clubs for students. Here, “fast” refers to the delivery of food, not its consumption.

Between 3:00 and 5:30 p.m. on Hong Kong weekdays, McDonald’s restaurants are invaded by armies of young people in school uniforms. They buy a few fries, pour them out on a tray for communal snacking,
China’s Big Mac Attack

and sit for at least an hour—gossiping, studying, and flirting. During the midmorning hours, the restaurants are packed with white-haired retirees who stay even longer, drinking tea or coffee (free refills for senior citizens) and lingering over pancake breakfasts. Many sit alone, reading newspapers provided by the management. Both retirees and students are attracted by the roomy tables, good light, and air-conditioning—a combination not easily found in Hong Kong, Beijing, or Shanghai. In effect, local citizens have appropriated private property and converted it into public space.

The process of localization correlates closely to the maturation of a generation of local people who grew up eating fast food. By the time the children of these pioneer consumers entered the scene, McDonald’s was an unremarkable feature of the local landscape. Parents see the restaurants as havens for their school-age children: smoking is banned and (in China and Hong Kong) no alcohol is served, effectively eliminating drugs and gangs. McDonald’s has become so local that Hong Kong’s youth cannot imagine life without it.

Everyone has heard the story: Japanese little leaguers tour California and spot a McDonald’s, whereupon they marvel that America also has Japanese food. Such anecdotes are not apocryphal. The children of visiting colleagues from Taiwan and South Korea were overjoyed when they saw a McDonald’s near their temporary homes in the Boston suburbs: “Look! They have our kind of food here,” one eight-year-old Korean exclaimed. The stories also work within East Asia: last year, Joe Bosco, an anthropologist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, took several of his students to Taipei for a study tour. After a week of eating Taiwanese restaurant food, Bosco’s charges began to complain that they missed home-style cooking. “Okay,” Bosco said, “where do you want to eat tonight?” The students all said, “McDonald’s!”

NEXT TO GODLINESS

In China’s increasingly affluent cities, parents now worry more about what their children eat outside the home. Rumors frequently sweep through Beijing and Shanghai with the same story line: migrants from the countryside set up a roadside stall selling youtiao, deep-fried dough sticks eaten with rice gruel for breakfast. To expand
the batter, they add industrial detergent to the mix, creating a powerful poison that kills everyone who eats it. Families of the deceased rush back to the scene to discover that the stall has disappeared; the local police are more interested in silencing the survivors than pursuing the culprits. Such stories are, of course, unverifiable, but they carry a “truth” that resists official denials, much like urban legends in the United States. Last summer’s food scare in Belgium over dioxin-laced eggs and the recent British mad-cow fiasco were well covered in the Chinese media, feeding the anxieties of urbanites with no reliable system of consumer protection.

McDonald’s appeals to China’s new elites because its food is safe, clean, and reliable. Western intellectuals may scoff at McDonald’s for its unrelenting monotony, but in many parts of the world (including China) this is precisely what consumers find so attractive. Why else would competitors go to such extremes to imitate McDonald’s? In Beijing one can find fast-food restaurants with names such as McDucks, Mcdonald’s, and Mordornal. In Shanghai a local chain called Nancy’s Express used a sign with one leg of the double arches missing, forming an “N.” Another popular chain of noodle shops, called Honggaoliang (Red sorghum), advertises itself with a large “H” that bears an uncanny resemblance to the “Golden Arches.” All over China, competitors dress their staff in McDonald’s-style uniforms and decorate their restaurants in yellow. Corporate mascots inspired by Ronald McDonald—clowns, ducks, cowboys, cats, hamburger figures, mythic heroes, and chickens—parade along the sidewalks of Chinese cities. Local fast-food chains frequently engage in public exhibitions of cleanliness: one worker mops the floors and polishes the windows, all day long, every day. The cleaners usually restrict their efforts to the entryway, where the performance can best be seen by passersby.

SO LONELY

During McDonald’s first three years in China, Communist Party officials could barely restrain their enthusiasm over this new model of modernization, hygiene, and responsible management. By 1996, however, media enthusiasm cooled as state authorities began to promote an indigenous fast-food industry based on noo-
China's Big Mac Attack

dles, barbecued meats, soups, and rice pots. Now that McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Pizza Hut had shown the way, party officials reasoned, local chains should take over the mass market. (No such chain has seriously challenged McDonald’s, but a Shanghai-based restaurateur has fought a much-reported “battle of the chickens” with KFC.)

Meanwhile, China faces yet another family revolution, this one caused by the graying of the population. In 1998, 10 percent of China’s people were over 60; by 2020, the figure is expected to rise to approximately 16 percent. In 2025, there will be 274 million people over 60 in China—more than the entire 1998 U.S. population. Since Beijing has made few provisions for a modern social-security system, the implications are profound. The locus of consumer power will soon shift generations as the parents of today’s little emperors retire. Unlike the current generation of retirees—the survivors of Maoism—China’s boomers will not be content with 1950s-level pensions, and they cannot expect their children to support them. Like their counterparts in the American Association of Retired Persons, future retirees in China are likely to be a vociferous, aggressive lot who will demand more state resources.

So what will happen to child-centered industries? If its experience in Hong Kong is any guide, McDonald’s will survive quite handily as a welcoming retreat from the isolation and loneliness of urban life. The full ramifications of China’s single-child policy will not be felt for another 20 years. Having one grandchild for every four grandparents is a recipe for social anomie on a truly massive scale. The consequences of China’s demographic time bomb can already be seen on the streets of Hong Kong, where the family began to shrink decades ago. Tens of thousands of retirees roam Hong Kong’s air-conditioned shopping malls, congregate in the handful of overcrowded parks, and turn their local McDonald’s during the midmorning hours into a substitute for the public gardens, opera theaters, and ancestral halls that sheltered their parents. What stands out at McDonald’s is the isolation among Hong Kong elders as they try to entertain themselves. Americans may be bowling alone and worrying about the decline of family life, but in early 21st-century Hong Kong, no one even seems concerned about the emergence of a civil society that ignores the elderly.
Is McDonald’s leading a crusade to create a homogenous, global culture that suits the needs of an advanced capitalist world order? Not really. Today’s economic and social realities demand an entirely new approach to global issues that takes consumers’ perspectives into account. The explanatory device of “cultural imperialism” is little more than a warmed-over version of the neo-Marxist dependency theories that were popular in the 1960s and 1970s—approaches that do not begin to capture the complexity of today’s emerging transnational systems.

The deeper one digs into the personal lives of consumers anywhere, the more complex matters become. People are not the automatons many theorists make them out to be. Hong Kong’s discerning consumers have most assuredly not been stripped of their cultural heritage, nor have they become the uncomprehending dupes of transnational corporations.

In places like Hong Kong, it is increasingly difficult to see where the transnational ends and the local begins. Fast food is an excellent case in point: for the children who flock to weekend birthday parties, McDonald’s is self-evidently local. Similarly, the Hong Kong elders who use McDonald’s as a retreat from the loneliness of urban life could care less about the company’s foreign origin. Hong Kong’s consumers have made the “Golden Arches” their own.

One might also turn the lens around and take a close look at American society as it enters a new millennium. Chinese food is everywhere, giving McDonald’s and KFC a run for their money in such unlikely settings as Moline and Memphis. Mandarin is fast becoming a dominant language in American research laboratories, and Chinese films draw ever more enthusiastic audiences. Last Halloween, every other kid in my Cambridge neighborhood appeared in (Japanese-inspired) Power Ranger costumes, striking poses that owe more to Bruce Lee than to Batman. Whose culture is it, anyway? If you have to ask, you have already missed the boat.

WHOSE CULTURE IS IT, ANYWAY?